大国博弈|《经济学人》：中国的锐实力，西方难以挡抵？2017-12-17 05:49
本期导读：综合国力（comprehensive national power），是一个著名的当代中国原创的政治概念，用于反映当今各个民族国家的一般国力，这个概念与其他的当代西方政治理论、马克思列宁主义以及20世纪早期中国人的传统思维没有关系。 在当代中国的政治思想中，中国大陆政府的主要目标是最大限度地提高中国大陆的综合国力。“综合国力”概念主要考虑经济等软实力因素，是为了防止中国大陆走苏联的老路，犯苏联发展经济时在军事上过度投资开支的错误。 硬实力（hard power），是指一个国家的支配性实力，包括基本资源（如土地面积、人口、自然资源）、军事力量、经济力量和科技力量等，通俗的说硬实力是指看得见、摸得着的物质力量。 软实力（soft power），是指在国际关系中，一个国家所具有的除经济及军事外的实力，主要是文化、价值观、意识形态及民意等方面的影响力，该词汇由美国哈佛大学教授约瑟夫·奈提出，根据其说法，硬实力是一国利用其军事力量和经济实力强迫或收买其他国家的能力，软实力则是“一国透过吸引和说服别国服从你的目标从而使你得到自己想要的东西的能力”。 巧实力（smart power）是约瑟夫·奈尔在“硬实力”、“软实力”之后，著书诠释的第三种国家实力，巧实力意指“结合硬实力和软实力的致胜策略能力”，巧实力“牵涉到外交、游说、斡旋、示威、影响等有效率又合于情理法的策略运用”，换言之，巧实力是所有军事和外交手段双管齐下、软硬兼施的策略能力。 锐实力（sharp power），很容易和软实力相混淆。锐实力是指独裁或威权政权利用影响力针对目标国家中的政治环境或信息环境进行渗入、渗透或离间的行为，其目的并不一定是为了寻求赢得“民心民意”（而软实力一般意在此），而是为了试图通过操控目标群体所能收到的信息而实现对目标群体的影响。 利用锐实力的国家，一般都具有相似的意识形态模式，包括国家权力重于个体权利，对自由表达、公开讨论、独立思想持有根本性的敌视。通过锐实力的渗透，独裁或威权政治的某些价值观念，比如权力垄断、由上到下式的控制、媒体审查、胁迫收买等，也会随之渗透到目标国家之中。锐实力的影响，主要表现在能让实施者的影响力深入到目标国家的社会肌理，促生社会分歧，让社会分裂更严重。 Sunlight v subversion 阳光下行事儿vs暗地里搞事儿 Sharp power 锐实力 China is manipulating decision-makers inWestern democracies. The best defence is transparency 东方大国中国，正在搅动西方民主国家的决策层。而西方对此最好的布防，就是透明。 WHEN a rising power challenges an incumbent one, war often follows. That prospect, known as the Thucydides trap after the Greek historian who first described it, looms over relations between China and the West, particularly America. So, increasingly, does a more insidious confrontation. Even if China does not seek to conquer foreign lands, many people fear that it seeks to conquer foreign minds. 当一个崛起大国挑战一个守成大国时，通常会爆发战争，是谓“修昔底德陷阱”，因古希腊历史学家修昔底德而得名，这样的情势，在中国与西方，特别是美国之间，也正在显现。而且，一场更为隐暗的对抗角力，也正逐渐浮出水面。即使中国不寻求占领外国的土地，很多人却担心，中国正试图占领外国的人心。 Australia was the first to raise a red flag about China’s tactics. On December 5th allegations that China has been interfering in Australian politics, universities and publishing led the government to propose new laws to tackle“unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated” foreign efforts to influence lawmakers. This week an Australian senator resigned over accusations that, as an opposition spokesman, he took money from China and argued its corner. Britain, Canada and New Zealand are also beginning to raise the alarm. On December 10th Germany accused China of trying to groom politicians and bureaucrats. And on December 13th Congress held hearings on China’s growing influence. 对于中国使出的伎俩，澳大利亚是第一个拉响红色警报的西方国家。12月5日，有关中国在澳大利亚政界、大学以及出版行业的干涉指控，使得澳大利亚政府提出新法案，以应对立法议员受到“史无前例的、越来越复杂精准的”外国势力的影响。本周，一位澳大利亚参议员因作为反对党发言人时收受中方资金并为自己辩护而辞职。英国、加拿大以及新西兰也都正拉响红色警报。12月10日，德国指责中国试图通过社交网站搜集德国高官情资以进行收买。12月13日，美国国会就中国逐渐增强的影响力举行了听证会。 This behaviour has a name—“sharp power”,coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based foundation and think-tank. “Soft power” harnesses the allure of culture and values to add to a country’s strength; sharp power helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad. 中国的这种行为有一个很不错的名字，叫做“锐实力”，这个词儿由位于华盛顿的智库美国国家民主基金会首创。“软实力”主要是指通过文化、价值观的吸引力来增强自己的影响力，而“锐实力”则主要是指独裁或威权政权通过胁迫、操控外国人的态度来增强自己的影响力。 The West needs to respond to China’s behaviour, but it cannot simply throw up the barricades. Unlike the old Soviet Union, China is part of the world economy. Instead, in an era when statesmanship is in short supply, the West needs to find a statesmanlike middle ground. That starts with an understanding of sharp power and how it works. 对于中国的行为，西方需要予以回应，不过，回应的方式，却不能是通过构建隔离壁障。不像曾经的苏联，中国目前是世界经济体系的一部分。而且，当今这个时代，是一个缺乏治理之术的时代，因此，西方也就需要找到一种治理相关的中间道路。要找到这样的一条道路，首先要做的就是，需要明白什么是“锐实力”，以及“锐实力”都是怎么起作用的。 Influencing the influencers 对影响者施加影响 Like many countries, China has long tried to use visas, grants, investments and culture to pursue its interests. But its actions have recently grown more intimidating and encompassing. Its sharp power has a series of interlocking components:subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self-censorship. For China, the ultimate prize is pre-emptive kowtowing by those whom it has not approached, but who nonetheless fear losing funding, access or influence. 与很多国家一样，中国很长时间以来都一直使用签证、赠与、投资以及文化来追求自己的利益。不过，近年来，中国的行动已变得越来越气势凌人、无所不包。中国的“锐实力”，有着系列互相关联的要素组成：搞破坏、耍横、施压，最终形成合力促成目标对象进行自我审查。对中国来说，最高的奖赏或许就是不用采取行动，目标对象就因担心失去资金、支持或影响力提前向中国低头哈腰。 China has a history of spying on its diaspora, but the subversion has spread. In Australia and New Zealand Chinese money is alleged to have bought influence in politics, with party donations or payments to individual politicians. This week’s complaint from German intelligence said that China was using the LinkedIn business network to ensnare politicians and government officials, by having people posing as recruiters and think-tankers and offering free trips. 中国对目标对象的跟踪监控，有着悠久的历史，但最近“搞破坏”这种行径，也已开始采用。在澳大利亚和新西兰，中方的资金据称已在政界产生了影响力，主要通过政党捐献或向个体政界人士支付款项。本周德国情报机构抱怨说，中国让人扮演成人力资源猎头、智库研究人员并提供免费旅行，利用领英商务网络吸引德国政界人士和政府官员上钩。 Bullying has also taken on a new menace.Sometimes the message is blatant, as when China punished Norway economically for awarding a Nobel peace prize to a Chinese pro-democracy activist. More often, as when critics of China are not included in speaker line-ups at conferences, or academics avoid study of topics that China deems sensitive,individual cases seem small and the role of officials is hard to prove. But the effect can be grave. Western professors have been pressed to recant. Foreign researchers may lose access to Chinese archives. Policymakers may find that China experts in their own countries are too ill-informed to help them. 第二招：耍横。不惜利用各种伎俩来实现政治目的。 Because China is so integrated into economic, political and cultural life, the West is vulnerable to such pressure.Western governments may value trade over scoring diplomatic points, as when Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticising China’s record on human rights, shortly after a Chinese firm had invested in the port of Piraeus.The economy is so big that businesses often dance to China’s tune without being told to. An Australian publisher suddenly pulled a book, citing fears of “Beijing’s agents of influence”. 第三招：施压。经济、政治、文化三位一体，向目标对象施加压力。 What to do? 西方该咋办？ Facing complaints from Australia and Germany, China has called its critics irresponsible and paranoid—and there isindeed a danger of anti-Chinese hysteria. However, if China were being more truthful, it would point out that its desire for influence is what happens when countries become powerful. 面对澳大利亚和德国的指控，中国则称那些批评声音不负责任、纯属臆想。也确实，在应对中国影响力这方面，有失去理性的风险。不过，中国可以表现的更真诚些，可以直接说出来自己的欲望和想法，毕竟，不管哪个国家，强大了后，都想要扩大影响力。但中国，就是不说出来，总憋在心里，憋坏了可如何是好？！ China has a lot more at stake outside its borders today than it did. Some 10m Chinese have moved abroad since 1978. It worries that they will pick up democratic habits from foreigners and infect China itself. Separately, Chinese companies are investing in rich countries, including in resources, strategic infrastructure and farmland. China’s navy can project power far from home. Its government frets that its poor image abroad will do it harm. And as the rising superpower, China has an appetite to shape the rules of global engagement—rules created largely by America and western Europe and routinely invoked by them to justify their own actions. 目前，中国在海外的利益比以往历史上任何时期都要多。自1978年以来，约有1000万中国人移民海外，中国担心他们会把国外的某些不良习惯带回中国并影响中国。另外，中国公司在发达国家的投资也遍布各个领域，包括资源、战略性基础设施、农场等。中国的海军远海力量投放能力也今非昔比。中国担心，海外形象不好会给自己带来伤害。而且，作为一个正在崛起的超级大国，中国也有很大的胃口，想要重塑全球的规则，而现在的规则，主要是由美欧国家设立，并经常被美欧国家拿来以证明自己行为的正当性。 To ensure China’s rise is peaceful, the West needs to make room for China’s ambition. But that does not mean anything goes. Open societies ignore China’s sharp power at their peril. 为确保中国能和平崛起，西方国家需要给中国的雄心提供一定空间。不过，这也不意味着，它想干嘛就干嘛。只要保持开放性的社会，就能让中国的“锐实力”没有用武之地，若再乱来，就让它吃不了兜着走。 Part of their defence should be practical.Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion. All three need Chinese speakers who grasp the connection between politics and commerce in China. The Chinese Communist Party suppresses free expression, open debate and independent thought to cement its control. Merely shedding light on its sharp tactics—and shaming kowtowers—would go along way towards blunting them. 布防的话，一方面，在现实层面，进行反情报搜集、完善法律法规、维持媒体独立性，都是应对“搞破坏”的最佳选择。所有这三个方面，都需既要懂汉语又要懂中国政经版图的人才。 Part should be principled. Unleashing awitch-hunt against Chinese people would be wrong; it would also make Western claims to stand for the rule of law sound hollow. Calls from American politicians for tit-for-tat “reciprocity”, over visas for academics and NGO workers, say, would be equally self-defeating. Yet ignoring manipulation in the hope that China will be more friendly in the future would only invite the next jab. Instead the West needs to stand by its own principles, with countries acting together if possible, and separately if they must. The first step in avoiding the Thucydides trap is for the West to use its own values to blunt China’s sharp power. 另一方面，在原则层面，首先，不能对华人进行政治追杀，这是大错特错，否则，会使得西方所称的法治显得空洞无物。美国政界人士所呼吁的“以眼还眼、以牙还牙”，比如利用对学术人员和非政府组织工作者的签证来进行报复，这也同样是自掘坟墓。不过，若对中国的行径视而不见，想着将来中国自己会变得更为友好自己停下来，那只能是痴人说梦。而西方国家应该做的就是，坚守自己的原则，不管是一起行动时还是单个国家独自行动时，都得这样。要避免世界陷入修昔底德陷阱，西方国家首先要做的就是，利用自己的价值观，来迎战中国的“锐实力”。
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发表于 2018-2-20 18:12:53
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